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DuPree College of Management at Georgia Tech. Deaves is a professor at the
Michael C. DeGroote School of Business at McMaster University. The authors
thank Jerry Dwyer, Mark Fisher, and Larry Wall for helpful comments.

We are merely reminding ourselves that human decisions affecting the future, whether personal
or political or economic, cannot depend on strict mathematical expectation, since the basis for
making such calculations does not exist; and that it is our innate urge to activity which makes
the wheels go round, our rational selves choosing between the alternatives as best we are able,
calculating where we can, but often falling back for our motive on whim or sentiment or chance.
—John Maynard Keynes (1964, 162–63)

he popular press commonly reports that
psychology drives financial decision
making and moves asset prices. Yet traditional implementations of financial
economic models routinely assume that
individuals incorporate information into
their decision processes using the rules of probability and statistics with calculated, unemotional logic.
This assumption leaves little room for the influence
of emotion. Furthermore, when economists have
included emotion in describing the behavior of
financial markets, emotion is often characterized
as causing unwarranted and undesirable price
movements. For example, in his book Irrational
Exuberance, Robert Shiller states that investors’
emotional state “is no doubt one of the most important factors causing the bull market” recently experienced in the United States (2000, 57).
Is a “rational” person a cool, unemotional user of
logic and the laws of probability? Two characters from
the popular television and movie series Star Trek provide an answer. Mr. Spock—who is half Vulcan, a
species that suppresses emotion and prizes logic—
is presented as a rational thinker who thoroughly
considers every piece of information. In contrast,
Captain Kirk is likely to respond emotionally. Yet Kirk
is portrayed as a good decision maker. Though Spock
fully analyzes each situation, he gets too caught up
in the details. Emotion allows Kirk to focus and
enhances his ability to make critical decisions.

T

A vast psychological literature shows that emotional state can significantly affect decision making
(Elster 1998; Hermalin and Isen 2000). In contrast
to studies by some other financial economists, this
article demonstrates that emotion actually enhances
an individual’s ability to make rational choices (see
also Frank 1988; Damasio 1994; LeDoux 1996; Elster
1998; Isen 1999). Emotion allows people to transcend the details, prioritize, and focus on the decision to be made. Emotion can drive behavior that is
consistent with economic predictions.
Understanding what behavior is economically
rational is complex. Behavioral research in finance
applies lessons from psychology to financial decision
making. One aspect of individual psychology that has
received a considerable amount of attention is that of
cognitive limitations. Individuals are limited in their
abilities to encode, process, and retrieve information.
In some cases, psychologists argue that these limitations result in biased judgments. Psychologists posit
that individuals develop rules of thumb, or heuristics,
to promote good decision making with minimal processing. Heuristics allow people to make decisions
while economizing on processing. Although individuals develop habits that often serve them well, these
habits might occasionally lead them astray. Behavioral
finance research has focused primarily on these
biases, paying less attention to the role of emotion.
The examination of cognitive aspects of financial
behavior in isolation is troublesome and may be
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misleading. Emotional reactions or evaluations occur
at a very early stage and are more basic than cognitive
evaluations (Zajonc 1980; LeDoux 1996). Perceptions
encompass emotional aspects, which subsequently
guide judgment and decision making. Furthermore,
theorists recognize that emotion and cognition are
interdependent, rather than competing, influences
(Simon 1967).
The purpose of this article is to provide a framework from which future research on emotion in
financial markets can build.1 The discussion begins
by describing the vastly different views of human
behavior held by economists and psychologists.
After differentiating their approaches, the article

Individual psychology plays a limited role
in finance theory, which assumes that individuals maximize expected utility, with
expectations derived using the rules of
probability and statistics.

defines the term emotion, describes how emotions
can be categorized, and then describes how emotions influence human behavior. The focus then
turns to three particular aspects of emotion and
financial decision making: emotional disposition
and stock market pricing, the feeling of regret, and
investors’ emotional response to information. The
conclusion considers emotion and the traditional
financial economics paradigm.

The Psychology of Economists
conomists and psychologists take strikingly different approaches to the study of human decision making. Some have cultivated dialogues across
the disciplines, but the success of a discussion is
dependent on the particular issue (Hogarth and
Reder 1986). Economists argue that some empirical
analyses in psychology lack a theoretical basis.
Furthermore, economists argue that empirical evidence provided by psychologists gives little insight
into people’s decisions because these studies fail to
provide participants with meaningful (for example,
monetary) incentives and lack the discipline that
markets give to behavior. Some psychologists, on
the other hand, argue that economists’ models bear
little relation to actual behavior. Although economists typically assume that individuals choose
among alternatives in an internally consistent way,

E
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behavior in detailed experiments is often inconsistent with this assumption.
Individual psychology plays a limited role in
finance theory, which assumes that individuals maximize expected utility, with expectations derived
using the rules of probability and statistics. The efficient market hypothesis (EMH), though certainly
not the only economic model describing financial
market behavior, has been the central paradigm
in financial economics for more than thirty years. In
an efficient market, as Fama (1991) defined it, prices
reflect all available information. According to this
hypothesis, prices should reflect information in
such a way that the marginal profit acquired by acting on information does not exceed the marginal
cost of acquiring the information. This simple model
revolutionized prevailing thought in the 1970s on
how markets function. Early empirical evidence
supported the EMH. In his first review of an already
vast body of evidence, Fama proclaimed that the
“support of the efficient markets model is extensive,
and (somewhat uniquely in economics) contradictory evidence is sparse” (1970, 416). In fact, Michael
Jensen, another prominent scholar, asserted that
“there is no other proposition in economics which
has more solid empirical evidence supporting it
than the efficient market hypothesis” (1978, 95).
More recently, departures from the predictions of
the EMH have been reported, and many now argue
that markets do not efficiently incorporate information (Haugen 1995; Shiller 2000; Shleifer 2000).
Fischer Black (1986) provides a model in which some
investors trade on noise rather than information,
and, as a result, market prices are not efficient. Black’s
noise traders’ behavior is not driven by news related
to an asset’s underlying value and may not be fully
rational. Noise traders may trade because they mistakenly believe they are trading on information or
perhaps because they simply like to trade. Some
empirical evidence is consistent with the proposition
that irrational behavior results in market inefficiencies. For instance, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2001)
argue that investors frequently make large errors that
impede the EMH’s corrective forces.
The recognition that individual behavioral influences affect market outcomes initiated a new
research stream in financial economics—behavioral
finance. Behavioral finance research applies lessons
from psychology to financial decision making. This
research has focused primarily on cognitive biases,
paying scant attention to emotion’s role. Emotion is
clearly an important aspect of human psychology
though it is not fully understood. In fact, no generally accepted definition of emotions exists.
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What Are Emotions, and How Do
They Influence Behavior?
here is a vast body of research on emotions, but
the term is seldom defined. Rather, examples of
emotional states are provided. Emotion can be
defined loosely as a physiological state of arousal
triggered by beliefs about something (Elster 1998).
Arnold (1960) defines emotion as “the felt tendency
toward anything intuitively appraised as good (beneficial), or away from anything intuitively appraised as
bad (harmful)” (182). A strict definition of the term is
complex because emotion has cognitive, physiological, social, and behavioral aspects (Solomon 2000).
For many, the substance of an emotion is feeling.
But emotions are evaluative rather than purely bodily sensations or cognitive judgments (Frijda 2000).
An emotion may have no cognitive basis whatsoever:
“a rose smells good because it smells good” (Frijda
2000, 63). Each individual has a personal assessment of whether an object or state is good or bad.
Emotions are evaluative in that they evoke positive
or negative valences that can be described using
bipolar scales that define a continuous spectrum
from unpleasantness to pleasantness—for example,
unhappy to happy or pessimistic to optimistic
(Bradley and Lang 2000, 247).
Despite the lack of a unified definition of emotion,
there is some agreement on the set of emotions that
exist. According to Elster (1998), some states are
clearly emotions, including, for instance, anger,
hatred, guilt, regret, fear, pride, elation, joy, and
love. Elster further argues that these emotional
states can be differentiated from other mental
states on the basis of six features put forth long ago.
These features do not provide a complete definition
of emotion because not even one feature is an element of every emotion. Yet these six features remain
central to current discussion and provide a framework for understanding what an emotion is. The
brief descriptions that follow use one emotion—
regret—for illustrative purposes.

T

1. Cognitive antecedents. Emotions are triggered
by beliefs. An investor regrets an investment
decision because she believes that bad outcomes
could have been avoided.
2. Intentional objects. Emotions are about something. The object of an emotion is usually the
cognitive antecedent. For example, the poorly
performing investment is the object of the regretful investor.

3. Physiological arousal. Changes in hormonal
conditions and the autonomic nervous system
accompany emotions. The regretful investor may
feel pangs, a hollow stomach, or depression.
4. Physiological expressions. Observable expressions characterize emotions. Facial expressions,
posture, voice intonation, and outward appearance are noteworthy. The regretful investor may
appear pale, with slumped shoulders.
5. Valence. Emotions can be placed on a scale with
pleasure at one extreme and pain at the other.
Valence, or the experience of pleasure versus
pain, translates to happiness or unhappiness. The
regretful investor is decidedly unhappy about
the poor investment outcome.
6. Action tendencies. Emotions are associated
with a tendency to act. The regretful investor
might take actions to avoid being exposed to
similar investment opportunities.

Where Do Emotions Come from, and
Where Do They Take Us?
s a result of millions of years of selection, people
are well engineered to solve problems repeatedly encountered during evolution. The ability to
learn and adapt is critically important to survival.
Many emotions are useful responses that result from
evolutionary conditioning (Frank 1988; LeDoux
1996). For example, fear is a natural, rational, and
useful response in a dangerous situation. In fact,
emotional reactions and preferences can form with
no conscious recognition of the stimuli (Zajonc 1980).
According to Goleman (1995), an individual’s success in life depends as critically on what Goleman
calls the “emotional quotient” as on the individual’s
intelligence quotient (IQ). Romer (2000) argues that
some behaviors reported to be irrational or inconsistent with well-defined preferences might be
better explained by allowing complicated feelings
in economic models. People’s preferences may be
defined by arguments that are not reflected in some
economic models.
Path-breaking work by Damasio (1994) indicates
that a lack of emotion has striking effects on decision making. Damasio offers behavioral and physiological evidence in support of the hypothesis that
decision making is intertwined with emotion. He
studied brain-damaged patients who had impaired
emotional responses even though they retained
their cognitive abilities. The patients were emotionally flat as a result of frontal brain lobe damage, yet

A

1. This article does not attempt to provide an overview of the vast literature on investor psychology. A recent review is provided
by Hirshleifer (2001).
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their knowledge, attention, memory, language, and
abstract problem solving were unaffected. These
individuals had difficulty making decisions and
were unable to plan for the future or choose a
course of action. Damasio hypothesizes a connection between flawed reason and impaired feelings.
A patient, referred to as Elliot, provides an
example. While in his thirties, Elliot had experienced a severe change in personality following the
removal of a brain tumor. Before his illness, Elliot
was a successful husband, father, businessman, and
member of the community. After surgery, Elliot
could not hold a job, manage his time, or maintain
social relationships. Yet his IQ remained in the

A large body of literature supports the theory
that positive mood allows individuals to better
organize and assimilate information and facilitates creative problem solving.

superior range. Extensive testing indicated that
Elliot’s memory, perceptual ability, language, arithmetic ability, and ability to learn new material were
unaffected. Elliot had normal intellectual functioning but was completely unable to make a decision,
particularly one of a personal or social nature. Elliot
himself reported that he no longer responded in the
same way to emotional stimuli. What had once
caused a strong emotional response now caused
no reaction whatsoever. Although he could reason
through a problem, he could not choose a course of
action. For instance, if given the task of sorting
clients’ documents, Elliot could easily understand
the material. Yet his attention might be easily
diverted, or he might spend hours reading one document, or he might just as easily spend an extended
period of time pondering whether the classification
scheme was appropriate. Not surprisingly, it was
not long before his employment was terminated. A
series of financially ruinous ventures followed.
Damasio concludes that feelings have a very strong
influence on reasoning. A complete understanding
of human behavior requires recognition of the interconnection between the brain and the body. Reason
and emotion are part of the human organism.
Although emotional responses typically are characterized as irrational, recent research suggests that emotion and rational decision making are complementary.
36

Neurobiological studies (Damasio 1994; LeDoux
1996) indicate that emotion improves decision making in two respects. First, emotion pushes individuals
to make some decision when making a decision is
paramount. In some situations in life, so many options
exist that an individual could devote excessive
amounts of time to the decision-making process. An
individual could simply become overwhelmed by the
possibilities. Emotion provides a coping mechanism
and allows individuals to focus without being caught
up in the details.
Second, emotion can assist in making optimal
decisions. A vast psychological literature shows that
emotional state can significantly affect decision
making (Elster 1998; Hermalin and Isen 2000).
While strong emotional responses are often associated with poor decisions (particularly those of a
financial nature), recent research in psychology
indicates that the absence of emotions can also lead
to suboptimal decisions. Emotion helps to optimize
over the cost of optimization. Even mild emotional
states can affect behavior (Isen 2000). Positive feelings can make it easier to access information in the
brain, promote creativity, improve problem solving,
enhance negotiation, and build efficient and thorough
decision making. Emotion facilitates optimal-choice
behavior when a person is provided with several
courses of action (Rolls 1999).
Little attention has been paid to the direct role of
emotion on choices of a financial nature. Recently,
Lo and Repin (2001) studied the physiological
characteristics of professional securities traders
while they are engaged in live trading. They report
significant correlation between market events and
physiological characteristics including skin conductance and cardiovascular data. They conclude that
emotion is an important determinant of a trader’s
ability to survive in financial markets. Other recent
research has focused on the role of emotion in a
more indirect fashion. Specifically, anomalous financial behavior is frequently attributed to emotion.
The next section reviews some of these studies.

Emotional Disposition
person’s current emotional state may influence
financial decision making. For example, an individual in a good mood because of recent experience
or current position in life brings this positive outlook
to the task at hand. Ashbury, Isen, and Turken (1999)
argue that a positive mood enhances individual performance on many cognitive tasks. A large body of
literature supports the theory that positive mood
allows individuals to better organize and assimilate
information and facilitates creative problem solving.

A
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Others have argued that evidence on the importance of emotional disposition is provided by empirical results at the aggregate level (for instance,
Hirshleifer and Shumway 2003; Kamstra, Kramer,
and Levi 2003). Using data from twenty-six international stock exchanges, Hirshleifer and Shumway
argue that good moods resulting from morning sunshine lead to higher stock returns.2 The argument is
that, because people are more optimistic on a sunny
day, they are more inclined to buy stocks.
These aggregate studies of the effect of mood on
stock market pricing do not provide evidence on
how individual behavior translates into market outcomes. Yet theoretical and experimental evidence
suggests that even when individual behavior is, on
average, characterized as irrational, market outcomes
can be consistent with rational pricing (Ackert and
Church 2001; Jamal and Sunder 1996, 2001; Chen
and Yeh 2002).
More fundamentally, however, the relationship
between mood and risk tolerance is not well established. Risk aversion is important because changes
in risk aversion affect how much an individual is
willing to pay for a stock in response to changes in
mood. When an individual becomes elated, perhaps
because of good weather, he or she might become
more willing to buy stock at higher prices. If melancholy is associated with greater risk aversion, an
individual suffering from depression might associate lower valuations with stocks. The literature does
not provide compelling evidence that optimism or
euphoria leads to lower risk aversion or that depression or a poor mood leads to increased risk aversion.
According to Thaler and Johnson (1990), it is
extremely difficult to make generalizations about
preferences toward risk. They conclude that after a
series of winning gambles, individuals are willing to
take on more risk so that risk aversion declines after
prior gains.3 However, after an initial loss, experimental participants become more risk averse. Other
research shows that happy people are more opti-

mistic and assign higher probabilities to positive
events (Wright and Bower 1992). Yet decision-making
research shows that even though happy people are
more optimistic about their likelihood of winning a
gamble, they are much less willing to actually take
the gamble (Isen, Nygren, and Ashby 1988). They are
more risk averse. People in a good mood are less
likely to gamble because they do not want to jeopardize their good mood. Thus, it is not clear how positive
and negative emotional states affect risk preferences and, in turn, translate into market pricing.
Clearly, clinical depression is quite different from a
simple bad mood. Depression has a biochemical basis
and can occur without cognitive appraisals. A person
with no chemical imbalances might naturally experience anxiety in certain situations (for example, a job
interview), but a depressed person might feel chronically anxious with a view that the world is an inexhaustible source of threats. Furthermore, the modern
view of depression recognizes that the condition may
involve altered brain circuitry (LeDoux 2002).
As with the evidence on the effect of mood on risk
choices, experimental evidence concerning the relationship between risk tolerance and depression fails
to provide a clear picture. Some researchers question
the importance of anxiety and depression in explaining choices across risky alternatives (Hockey et al.
2000). Others conclude that risk aversion is correlated
with depressive tendencies (Eisenberg, Baron, and
Seligman 1998). Importantly, as these authors recognize, risk aversion is correlated with anxiety and
depression.4 Eisenberg, Baron, and Seligman report
that the correlation between depressive symptoms
and risk aversion arises from the correlation with
anxiety.5 The fundamental issue remains unresolved. While a depressed person shying away from
risk for no apparent reason may appear to be irrational, it may be perfectly rational for an anxious
person to move toward safer alternatives. Again,
much research needs to be done to move toward a
definitive conclusion.

2. Another stream of research in financial economics investigates the impact of investor sentiment on asset pricing. Sentiment
is broadly defined as the deviation in asset returns from that predicted by the fundamental determinants of asset value, such
as dividends (Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler 1991). The source of the sentiment may be noise (Black 1986). Though not postulated
in the literature, the source of sentiment, as discussed in the finance literature, could also be changes in the emotional
disposition of the population of investors.
3. Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) have formulated a theoretical model of this behavior that predicts that individuals will
become more risk averse after a fall in stock prices. Investors derive utility from changes in wealth and are more sensitive to
decreases in wealth than to increases.
4. Note that this study, like many others, is based on hypothetical questions, and, thus, decisions are not financially motivated.
Furthermore, the measure of depressive symptoms is based on a survey given to a sample of students registered in a college
course. The incidence of clinically diagnosed depression in this sample is not reported.
5. Interpretation of the results becomes even more difficult because Raghunathan and Pham (1999) find that anxiety and sadness
have distinct influences on behavior.
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Regret
egret is an emotion that colors an investor’s
current disposition. Some claim that fear of
regret can drive certain financial decisions. This
emotion is counterfactual in that it is generated by
thoughts about what might have happened but did
not. Clearly, regret is a negative emotion. An investor
may regret a bad investment decision but is not
likely to regret a good one.
Psychologists recognize the important impact
regret can have on decision making. According to
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), individuals have
strong desires to avoid the feeling of regret. They
argue that a number of the implications of expect-

R

This article argues that emotion is an important aspect of the human condition that can
enhance decision making.

ed utility theory are not corroborated by experimental evidence and provide an alternative to the
standard economic paradigm—prospect theory.
Central to their theory is the notion of loss aversion: Individuals will change their behavior in order
to avoid recognizing losses. Experimental subjects,
given the hypothetical choice between $500 with
certainty versus a coin flip for $1,000, will usually
choose the former: they are risk averse.6 This risk
aversion, however, would also imply that subjects
should choose a loss of $500 with certainty rather
than the flip of a coin where they can either return
to zero or lose an extra $500. In the experiments,
however, most subjects choose the gamble: They
are risk loving in the domain of losses. Kahneman
and Tversky argue that individuals wish to avoid
the negative feeling of regret that would occur if
they have to recognize a loss, and so they alter
their “normal” risk-averse tendencies. The results
from these hypothetical situations should be interpreted with caution because individuals may
behave quite differently if given significant, monetary incentives.
Shefrin and Statman (1985) argue that regret is
an important factor explaining the disposition
effect—the tendency to sell superior-performing
stocks too early and hold on to losing stocks too
long. Shefrin and Statman include Kahneman and
38

Tversky’s prospect theory as a framework to explain
why investors might sell winners too early while
holding on to losers. According to Shefrin and
Statman, investors are more likely to realize gains
than losses. The fear of regret leads investors to
postpone losses whereas, symmetrically, the desire
for pride leads to the realization of gains. An individual experiences regret when closing a position
with a loss because of the poor investment decision.
Conversely, an individual feels pride or elation when
closing a position with a gain because his financial
decision resulted in a profit.
Standard economic models of choice can be
extended to incorporate emotions, including regret.
For example, in Hermalin and Isen’s (2000) model,
individuals are fully rational and maximize the discounted value of future utility. Emotions directly
enter utility functions, with negative emotions, such
as guilt or regret, reducing utility. This research
takes emotions as given, rather than trying to
explain why people have emotions, and concludes
that incorporating the psychological finding that
emotion affects decision making into models of
rational behavior gives important insight into
behavioral phenomena.

Emotional Reactions
hus far, this article has argued that emotional
disposition, including regret, can affect financial decision making. Emotional responses are also
induced by the plethora of stimuli people encounter
every day. An individual’s affective assessment is
the sentiment that arises from the stimulus. For
instance, when an individual is negotiating with
another party and experiences a feeling of dislike
for the other party, the outcome of the negotiation
is likely affected. Thus, affect refers to the quality
of a stimulus and reflects a person’s impression or
assessment. Cognitively, an individual’s perception includes affective reactions so that judgment
and decision making are inextricably linked to
these reactions.
Arguably, people’s thoughts are made up of
images that include perceptual and symbolic representations (Damasio 1994; Charlton 2000). The
images are marked by positive or negative feelings
that are linked to somatic (or bodily) states. At the
neural level, somatic markers arising from experience establish a connection between an entity or
event and a body state ( pleasant or unpleasant).
In effect, affective reactions are cognitive representations of distinct body states. People are
attracted to stimuli associated with positive
somatic markers and steer away from those asso-

T
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ciated with negative somatic markers. Readily
available affective reactions provide expedient means
for decision making because they make it far easier to weigh the pros and cons of alternative stimuli
(Finucane et al. 2000).
Research that directly examines the role of affect
in financial decisions is limited. More research is
warranted because affective reactions influence
judgment and decision making, even without cognitive evaluations (Zajonc 1980, 1984). Furthermore,
when affective reactions and cognitive evaluations
diverge, the emotional aspects can exert a dominating influence on behavior (Ness and Klass 1994;
Rolls 1999).
In the financial realm, MacGregor et al. (2000)
conclude that there is a relationship between the
image of a market and what has occurred in the
market. In their experiments, participants’ willingness
to invest in a firm was influenced by affective reactions to the firm’s industry membership. Ackert and
Church (2002) also examine the portfolio allocation
decisions of participants in financial experiments
with selective information disclosures concerning
available investment alternatives. Again, affective
assessments have significant effects on decision
making. Other work recognizes that affect is important in understanding managers’ financial decisions.
Kida, Moreno, and Smith’s (2001) experimental
results indicate that when making capital budgeting
decisions, individuals are more likely to reject projects that elicit negative emotions. Insight into market reactions awaits further investigation.

Conclusion
his article has suggested that although emotion
has important influences on financial behavior,
it does not contaminate judgment. Some have called
for a new paradigm, one that incorporates behavioral
influences and better models actual behavior. Without
question, the traditional finance paradigm has been
challenged. Many anomalies have been reported. Yet
a paradigm is rarely displaced by anomalies (Kuhn
1970). If a paradigm is to be replaced, it must be
replaced by another paradigm that provides a superior explanation of the facts. According to Kuhn, “so
long as the tools a paradigm supplies continue to
prove capable of solving the problems it defines,
science moves fastest and penetrates most deeply
through confident employment of those tools. The
reason is clear. As in manufacture so in science—
retooling is an extravagance to be reserved for the
occasion that demands it. The significance of crises
is the indication they provide that an occasion for
retooling has arrived” (1970, 76). Has the time for
retooling in finance reached Kuhn’s crisis level?
Though recent models explain certain aspects of
financial decision making that appear to be inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis, financial economists are without a superior paradigm.
Yet that is not to suggest that emotional behavior
should be ignored. While some argue that in certain
situations emotion may “get in the way” and lead to
suboptimal decision making, we believe that emotion is an important aspect of the human condition
that can actually enhance decision making.

T

6. Hypothetical choices may not be consistent with choices made when the incentives are real. In their experiments, Holt and
Laury (2002) show that subjects are considerably more risk averse when payoffs are in cash rather than hypothetical.
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